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1 PETITION FOR REHEARING 
) Case No. 910500 
i Category No. 3 
Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant Ronnie Lee Gardner, through his volunteer 
counsel, requests this Court to vacate its decision of November 10, 1994 and rehear this 
appeal and cross-appeal. This Petition for Rehearing is supported by the following argument 
and authorities: 
INTRODUCTION 
In this capital case, the reasons for the Court's decision to overturn the district court's 
grant of a new sentencing and new appeal, and to affirm the denial of relief on other 
grounds, are only partially known. Chief Justice Zimmerman and Justice Durham concurred 
in the result only, and did not explain the grounds for their decision. In the absence of a 
majority opinion of any opinion by Chief Justice Zimmerman or Justice Durham, this Petition 
can respond only to the opinion by Justice Stewart, which was joined by Justice Howe. The 
Stewart opinion will be cited as "Slip op." and referred to in the text as "Opinion". 
ARGUMENT 
Habeas Review 
Justice Stewart's statement that six issues would not be reviewed on the merits is 
inconsistent with rulings in other habeas corpus and postconviction cases. As Chief Justice 
Zimmerman has said, the essential question under the "unusual circumstances" test is: Is 
there a sufficiently good reason why issues were not raised earlier? Dunn v. Cook. 791 P.2d 
873 (Utah 1990) (Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
In Dunn, Chief Justice Zimmerman concluded that deficient representation on appeal 
constituted an unusual circumstance, allowing consideration of an ineffective assistance claim 
in a collateral attack. 791 P.2d at 878. Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Durham, 
determined in Dunn that the cause and prejudicial standard used by federal habeas corpus 
courts to resolve procedural default issues is too strict to be applied by Utah state courts. 
791 P.2d at 876. Under the federal standard, ineffective assistance of counsel is cause for 
the failure to raise an issue. Murray v. Carrier. 477 U.S. 478 (1986). Therefore, at least 
three members of the Court would find unusual circumstances if the failure to raise an issue 
on appeal was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Mr. Gardner continues to contend that he received ineffective assistance of counsel on 
appeal. See, infra, at 9 . Further, in stating that the claim based on Robert Maori's 
hypnotically enhanced testimony would not be reviewed, Justice Stewart condones an unfair 
process by allowing the State to withhold waiver arguments iji the district court, yet assert 
them on appeal. The defense of procedural bar must be pleaded and proved by the State, 
and, after consideration of the facts and arguments offered in response by a petitioner, the 
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district court should enter findings of fact as to the circumstances under which an issue was 
not previously raised. 
Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony 
Justice Stewart misapprehended the facts in ruling that the admission of hypnotically 
enhanced testimony was not fundamentally unfair because it went only to a collateral issue. 
The defense presented at trial centered on the contention that Mr. Gardner did not 
intentionally kill Mr. Burdell. See State v. Gardner. 789 P.2d 273, 290-91 (Utah 1989) 
(Zimmerman, J., concurring). Trial counsel attempted to show that Mr. Gardner was in 
shock from the wound in his chest and lung, and that he accidentally shot Mr. Burdell when 
the closing door startled him. 
As trial counsel Andy Valdez explained in the postconviction hearing, Robert Macri's 
testimony at the preliminary hearing was important to this defense. Mr. Macri testified there 
that the events in the file room occurred in a matter of seconds, and that the door started to 
close "practically simultaneously" with the shot. (T. 960-61, 964). Based on the preliminary 
hearing testimony, trial counsel believed that there had not been enough time for Mr. 
Gardner to plan and intend the shooting. (H. 141). However, on the day before the trial 
began, counsel learned that Mr. Macri's account of the events had changed, and that his 
difference in his testimony would be "devastating." (H. 141-42). In his trial testimony, Mr. 
Macri asserted that Mr. Gardner was moving the gun toward Mr. Burdell, and that he caused 
the door to close as he attempted to avoid being shot. (T. 2217). Rather than being 
"collateral," the issues of how the door closed and whether Mr. Gardner was startled into 
firing the gun were crucial to his defense based on lack of intent. 
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Victim Impact Evidence 
In ruling that no injustice resulted from testimony and arguments about 
commendable characteristics of the victim, Michael Burdell, Justice Stewart failed to address 
the inequity of allowing the prosecution to place this information before jurors while 
precluding the defense Gardner from advising them that he would not have wanted the death 
penalty for Mr. Gardner. It was unfair to allow evidence praising and invoking sympathy for 
Mr. Burdell without the balancing fact he would not have approved of a death sentence 
imposed to his punish his death, and that his family and friends did not seek Mr. Gardner's 
execution in retribution for the crime. 
Ineffective Assistance at Trial 
(1) Mitigation 
In reversing the district court's decision that trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance in the penalty phase of the case, Justice Stewart misapprehended the issue raised by 
Mr. Gardner, the conclusion reached by the court below and its supporting facts. The 
Opinion characterized the issue as follows: "The district court vacated Gardner's death 
sentence and granted him a new penalty hearing because defense counsel failed to provide 
Gardner's expert psychiatric witness sufficient time to examine Gardner prior to testifying at 
the penalty hearing." (Slip op. at 9). 
However, Mr. Gardner's Petition for Postconviction Relief and/or Writ of Habeas 
Corpus included the claim that trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance in 
investigating and presenting a case in mitigation. The trial court's ruling also addressed more 
than the issue of whether counsel had provided enough time for Dr. Peter Heinbecker's 
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interview of Mr. Gardner. The court below found that trial counsel failed to present a 
cohesive and understandable theory of mitigation, that they did not adequately investigate 
mental health issues before trial and that a satisfactory mental health evaluation had never 
been conducted. (Memorandum Decision, at 23-24). 
In this ruling, the trial court's findings focus not only on the fact that trial counsel 
contacted Dr. Heinbecker "a mere 24 hours before he testified," (Memorandum Decision, at 
23), but also on the facts that counsel did not seek testimony from Dr. Mark Rindflesh, and 
that after discussing the case with Dr. Agnes Plenk, "[njo turther effort was made to seek 
professional assistance for petitioner, nor seek State assistance in doing so." (Memorandum 
Decision, at 24). Rather than addressing only the "failure to provide more time to Dr, 
Heinbecker to prepare," (Slip op. at 13), the district court considered all of counsel's actions 
and omissions in failing to investigate and obtain effective mental health mitigating evidence. 
Justice Stewart also misapprehended the facts in deciding that Mr. Gardner was not 
prejudiced by any insufficiency of the case in mitigation. Although the State argued below 
that there was no evidence of organic brain dysfunction in the record, Justice Stewart 
concluded that there was no prejudice in part because "Dr. Heinbecker testified [at the 
penalty hearing] that Gardner suffered from organic brain damage." (Slip op. at 11). 
At the sentencing hearing, Dr. Heinbecker's testimony was tentative and equivocal, 
and he made a point of informing jurors out that he had not had enough time to prepare. In 
interviewing Mr. Gardner for one hour, discussing him with family members for about 2.5 
hours and reviewing incomplete records, Dr. Heinbecker "tried to pick out ... general factors 
that were important," and found in early records "some evidence that he had organic brain 
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damage" as a result of meningitis and sniffing glue and gasoline. (T. 2796). Cross-
examination focused on whether organic brain syndrome had ever been actually diagnose or 
was merely a possibility. The prosecution effectively challenged Dr. Heinbecker's 
interpretation of the old records, and impeached him with a report he had not reviewed. Dr. 
Heinbecker's trial testimony only established that additional testing was required to prove or 
rule out organic brain syndrome. 
Justice Stewart also noted that Dr. Heinbecker discussed three other factors. But 
again, only a superficial treatment of these factors was possible, and the language Dr. 
Heinbecker used was equivocal. Overall, the testimony from Dr. Heinbecker and other 
defense witnesses painted a picture of Mr. Gardner as a wilful child who simply chose to 
avoid discipline from his father, to skip school, to experiment with drugs and to run from 
juvenile placements. Dr. Heinbecker's suggestion that Mr. Gardner grew up in an unstable 
environment, that his parents had been inadequate and neglected him and that his antisocial 
personality might have been genetic in origin did little to explain or ameliorate this portrait. 
Finally, Justice Stewart concluded that Mr. Gardner did not satisfy his "burden, in the 
habeas proceeding, to adduce what favorable evidence could have been presented in his 
behalf." (Slip op. at 11). In the absence of investigative and expert assistance, Mr. Gardner 
has not had a full and fair opportunity to litigate this issue. Mr. Gardner sought but was 
refused assistance in investigating and evaluating psychiatric, psychological and sociological 
mitigation. Dr. Heinbecker was not called as an expert in how to investigate mitigation, and 
he has never performed an adequate evaluation of Mr. Gardner. He was called to testify 
about the facts surrounding his penalty phase testimony. He did identify tests which should 
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have been conducted to explore organic brain syndrome, but his testimony was not and could 
not have been a substitute for that of a defense expert. Justice Stewart seems to suggest that 
Mr. Gardner should have elicited testimony from requiring Dr. Heinbecker faulting his own 
evaluation and penalty phase testimony. It is fundamentally unfair to hold that Mr. Gardner 
has not established prejudice when the State has refused to fund the defense services essential 
to this showing. 
(2) Other trial issues 
In his opinion, Justice Stewart summarily disposed of three ineffective assistance 
claims on the basis that they had been decided on direct appeal, directly or "in substance." 
(Slip op. at 7). These claims were that: (1) counsel were ineffective in deciding that Mr. 
Gardner should testify and pressuring him to do so; (2) counsel were ineffective in eliciting 
Mr. Gardner's criminal record during his direct examination; and (3) counsel were ineffective 
in failing to request a bifurcated proceeding to address the aggravating circumstance of a 
prior violent crime, under with Utah Code Ann. Section 76-5-202(1 )(h). Mr. Gardner 
contends that this summary disposition rests on an incorrect reading of the opinion in his 
direct appeal, State v. Gardner. 789 P.2d 273 (Utah 1989) [Gardner I]. 
As for claims (2) and (3), Justice Stewart concluded that they were resolved in two 
concurring opinions in Gardner I. However, then-Justice Zimmerman, joined by Justice 
Durham, and Justice Stewart decided only that the trial court's error in allowing evidence of 
two robbery convictions in the guilt phase, before the jury had found Mr. Gardner guilty of a 
knowing or intentional murder, was not prejudicial. 789 P.2d at 290-91. This issue is 
distinct from the postconviction claims that counsel should not have questioned Mr. Gardner 
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in the guilt phase direct examination about his criminal record, which included inadmissible 
convictions for aggravated assault and homicide, and that they should not have acquiesced in 
the non-bifurcated procedure used by the trial court. Although Justice Stewart correctly noted 
that the use of the robbery convictions was found to be harmless in Gardner I. that resolution 
does not answer the ineffective assistance claims here. The conclusion that any error was 
harmless relied in part on the fact that "Gardner took the stand and disclosed his extensive 
criminal record, which included other convictions that were more prejudicial than the two 
robberies." 789 P.2d at 290. 
Similarly, the claim that trial counsel acted unreasonably in deciding that Mr. Gardner 
should testify is different from the issue determined on direct appeal ~ that his alleged 
statements to Officer Jorgensen were admissible to impeach that testimony. Other important 
factors that were asserted in this claim were: counsel's belief that Mr. Gardner's criminal 
record would be admitted if he testified and that jurors would receive a negative impression 
when he refused to disclose the name of his accomplice. Although the Opinion does not 
address these factors, taken as a whole they establish that the decision to have Mr. Gardner 
testify was ineffective. 
Ineffective Assistance on Appeal and in Conflicts of Interest 
For the reasons stated in his briefs, Mr. Gardner contends that Justice Stewart's 
opinion is erroneous in its analysis of the conflicts of interest and ineffective assistance on 
appeal claims. 
Q 
Appointment of Experts and Investigators 
Justice Stewart's opinion presents indigent, condemned prisoners with an impossible 
"Catch-22" - a defendant in a postconviction proceeding is entitled to funding for experts 
and investigators, if he can show that a constitutional right was violated in his conviction, but 
in many cases can't establish a constitutional violation without investigative and expert 
assistance. (Slip op. at 18-19, n.5).1 This dilemma is illustrated in the instant case, with the 
result that Mr. Gardner has not had a full and fair opportunity to challenge his conviction and 
death sentence. It is absurdly paradoxical to conclude that funding for defense services was 
not required because Mr. Gardner did not show "that he could not adequately pursue habeas 
claims without appointed investigators and experts," while holding that the lack of expert 
testimony to establish prejudice defeats his ineffective assistance claims. 
DATED this 27th day of December, 1994. 
C&AIG L. TRUMAN^ ) 
KAREN A. CHANE(Y/ 
MANNY GARCIA 
Attorneys for Ronnie Lee Gardner 
1
 Justice Stewart's suggestion, although perhaps attempting to deal with the 
recognized inequities of requiring capital defendants to litigate their postconviction claims 
without compensated counsel or the assistance of experts and investigators, will be difficult to 
implement, and will have some unusual ramifications. Delaying compensation until 
constitutional issues have been finally resolved by the courts does little to provide the funding 
necessary to prepare the case. Further, tying the right to compensated assistance to the 
demonstration of a constitutional violation appears similar to authorizing a contingent fee 
agreement in a criminal case. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of this Petition for Rehearing was placed in the United States 
Mail, postage prepaid and addressed to Marian Decker, Office of the Attorney General, 236 
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, on this 27th day of December, 1994. 
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